Within weeks of coming to power, Donald Trump has opened the doors to a new world. As Ivan Krastev has pointed out, we are not witnessing a mere change of political direction, but a revolution, that is, an assault on the established order with the aim of completely overthrowing it and replacing it with another.
His attempt may succeed in part or in whole. If it does, it will have serious consequences for the rest of liberal democracies. As we heard in the speech delivered by Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference last February, the new American elites are not content with proclaiming the validity of these principles as new guidelines for the government of the United States, but believe that their particular crusade must be the new creed that Washington preaches and spreads throughout the world.
In their attempt to demolish the existing order, Trump, Musk, and Vice President J. D. Vance make clear their outright rejection of the liberal rules-based order. The theorists of this revolution, influenced by new authoritarian theories emerging from Silicon Valley, despise it, calling it the “Old Regime.”
Beyond their borders, the new American revolutionaries want to establish an international order in their own image, with as few constraints outside as they are willing to accept at home. That means an international order in which sovereignty is not limited by law, but only by the relative power of states.
Trump is leading us to a world of great powers, spheres of influence, and vassal states. That is why his relentless attacks on the European Union, the former ally that represents everything the new revolutionaries hate about the old liberal order, should come as no surprise: open societies and markets governed by democratic political systems that share sovereignty, submit to supranational institutions, and are governed by international law and multilateralism in their relations with third parties.
American revolutionaries are not satisfied with European submission to US dictates. They want Europeans to align themselves with this revolution within their own countries, hence their promotion of extremist forces such as Alternative for Germany and their characterization of Europe as a territory where freedom of expression is limited. Therefore, if Europe wants to have a peaceful relationship with the United States, it will not only have to change its foreign policy in line with Washington’s dictates, but also adopt the US vision of democracy, market regulation, sexual freedom, and immigration.
An attack on three fronts
The US attack on Europe is being waged on three fronts: political, economic-commercial, and security. In the political arena, its goal is to support European forces and governments that share its agenda and align themselves with American revolutionaries. On the economic front, the strategy includes imposing tariffs on European imports, along with threats in case the EU sanctions or regulates large US technology companies. Finally, in the security sphere, they seek to reduce or withdraw US military support for Europe, thus disengaging themselves from its defense.
Of the three fronts, it is in the economic and commercial spheres that the EU has the least to fear, as it has instruments of defense at its disposal. Therefore, if the EU plays its cards right, it will ensure that, by imposing tariffs, the US will inflict more damage on itself than on the EU. On the technological front, however, US companies provide essential services that Europeans are not in a position to provide themselves. But it is on the third front, security, that Europe faces an existential challenge, as Trump aims to restore US relations with Russia at the cost of sacrificing Ukraine and leaving Europeans in charge of their own security.
Trump wants to reverse the terms of the relationship with a Europe he accuses of “bleeding” the United States in three ways: the trade deficit; regulations and fines on its technology companies; and the provision of security via NATO. Of the three arguments, the first two are clearly false. The US has a trade deficit with Europe in goods, but not in services, which means that the current account balance is virtually in equilibrium. And in terms of technology, US companies not only reap huge profits in Europe, but—as Enrico Letta pointed out in his recent report—European savers send nearly $300 billion a year to the US to finance all kinds of investments.
On the third point, however, we Europeans have no excuse. If we are in a position of weakness vis-à-vis Trump and Putin, it is our own fault. The reasons why the EU lacks a common defense policy are historical and complex, and have a lot to do with the fact that the US security umbrella has facilitated the demilitarization of Europe. All in all, Europeans are victims of their own indecision over the last decade, which has led them to ignore successive US administrations, starting with Obama and ending with Biden, who have repeatedly asked Europe to take responsibility for its own security and help the US pivot towards Asia to more effectively deter China, its new global rival.
Three European mistakes
Over the past decade, Europeans have made three mistakes, which are now proving very difficult to correct. First, they have avoided increasing their defense spending to 2% (something they had already committed to in 2014). This has left their armed forces without the muscle to provide an effective security guarantee to Ukraine—neither in 2014, at the end of the first war with Russia, nor now. Second, they ignored the signs of a Kremlin immersed in a revisionist policy of the post-Cold War order, trusting that energy interdependence with Russia would deter Putin from attacking Ukraine. Third, they have not built a European defense pillar, either within NATO or the EU, despite its obvious necessity.
The result is that they have failed to address their main problem, which is not low spending (combined European defense budgets still exceed Russia’s), but fragmentation and duplication, which turn the armies of European states into territorial defense forces capable only of securing external borders that, except in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries bordering Russia, are not in danger.
These three mistakes must be corrected urgently, even if the results are not immediately apparent. Europeans face an existential challenge. A Ukraine subjugated and brought under Moscow’s control would mean an EU with an extremely long direct border with a Russia emboldened by a peace agreement with Trump that would allow it to return to the energy markets and finance the reconstruction of its army. And that border will most likely have to be defended without a US security guarantee or with an uncertain guarantee, at least while Trump remains in power. Even with that guarantee, Europe’s security will require not only major investments in defense, but also significant progress in integration. Spending more on defense will not work if it is not spent jointly to seek economies of scale in the arms industries and, above all, if it is not spent in accordance with common strategic planning. All this requires, as Chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz has pointed out, thinking in terms of Europe’s independence.
In Bienvenido, Mr. Marshall (1953), a Spanish film directed by Luis García Berlanga, obsequious Spaniards fawned over their American friend to get the United States to include Spain in the Marshall Plan. In a memorable scene, the natives of that impoverished Spain, devastated by the Civil War, dreamed of American manna in the form of cows being dropped by parachute. The US security umbrella has allowed Europe to enjoy the best 80 years of peace, security, and prosperity in its history. But it has also generated practices, habits, and mentalities of vassalage that we must put an end to.
Europe faces a clear choice: become a vassal (of the United States or, in its eastern zone, of Russia) or achieve independence. Although the obstacles are enormous, both material and psychological, the European vassal must pack its bags and leave. If things go well, we will have a renewed transatlantic relationship based on equality and mutual respect. If things go wrong and we end up in a purely transactional world without rules or liberal values, the decision to earn our independence will have been more than justified. In a scenario that cannot be ruled out, Trump could not only weaken the United States and erode its global influence, but, paradoxically, also promote the consolidation of the European Union. Thus, the (new) American revolution would not bring independence to the United States, but to Europe.
